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The
Assault Landing at Sheikh Syed
War was declared with Turkey on 31 October 1914. This
event had been foreseen for some while and from early
that month it had been decided to send reinforcements
urgently from India to Egypt. One of the 20 battalions
earmarked for Egypt, the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Sikh
Pioneers, was re-tasked to go to Aden which had also
asked for reinforcements. In spite of its name this was
an infantry battalion, but with training as assault
pioneers. It will be referred to as the ‘1/23rd’. As a
result, on 30 October, the QMG in India ordered the
Embarkation Commandant to embark the 1/23rd on a fast
single-battalion transport.
One of the formations being sent to Egypt was the 11th
Indian Division; one of its brigades was the 30th
commanded by Brigadier General H V Cox. The three
infantry battalions in his brigade were the 14th Sikhs
and the 69th and 89th Punjabis.
In
mid-October Turkish forces had been reported to be
assembling in some strength on the borders of the Aden
Protectorate. In particular their presence at Sheikh
Syed immediately opposite Perim was deemed to be a
serious threat. A strategic weakness of Perim as a
coaling station was its proximity to the Turkish-held
mainland which put the island and port within range of
any but the lightest of artillery pieces and made an
assault landing mounted from Sheikh Syed a distinct
possibility. The decision was therefore taken to mount a
preemptive attack against Fort Turba, the same fort that
had been shelled two years previously by the Italian
cruiser Calabria and other vessels during the Italo-Turkish
war. The first indication in Aden that something might
be afoot was on 23 October when the CGS in India asked
GOC Aden for information regarding landing places at
Sheikh Syed.
HMS Duke of Edinburgh
The decision to attack Sheikh Syed was a military and
not a political one, and taken in India. It is not known
if the Viceroy was briefed as to what was planned, but
certainly a conscious decision was taken not to tell the
Secretary of State for India in Whitehall. His first
knowledge of the landing was to be the report sent on
its completion. In addition the Aden Residency was not
consulted as to the political implications and the
effect that such a landing might have on the local
tribes. After the operation had been completed the
authorities in Aden would make plain their view that the
landing had been counter productive as it had
antagonised the local rulers and also might provoke the
Turks into taking offensive action against Aden itself
(which they did in July the following year). However
considerable imagination and flexibility were shown in
the planning and mounting of this operation as it was
decided to mount an assault landing to spike the guns in
the fort rather than trying to knock them out by naval
gunfire. It is probably the first example in modern
warfare of an opposed assault landing.
It
was decided to use elements of what was about to be one
large convoy carrying the 11th Division to Egypt. The
urgency of reinforcing Egypt was such that the whole
operation had to be completed in not more than 36 hours.
On the evening of 4 November the two convoys carrying
the 11th Division received a coded signal from the CGS
in India that Sheikh Syed was to be captured and the
fortifications and its guns there be destroyed and the
wells put out of use. General Cox’s brigade, reinforced
by the 1/23rd, was to be used for the operation.
The signal was also sent to Aden where Major Bradshaw,
the GSO Aden (the equivalent of brigade major) was to be
ordered by GOC Aden (Major General Shaw, newly arrived)
to join Cox as the convoy passed Aden. Major Bradshaw
was to bring maps, local information and a plan of
attack which he would then submit to Cox for approval.
To try to prevent information of the impending operation
‘getting into the bazaar’ only Bell and Bradshaw were to
know what was planned.
The Admiral in India was asked (he could not be ordered)
to provide ‘naval cooperation’, in modern parlance naval
gunfire support. His initial response was very
unhelpful: he could not afford to provide a warship for
this as there was only one escorting the convoy. But he
should have realised that the following day the convoy
from Madras was due to meet up with another convoy from
Bombay, and this also had an escort. On 5 November the
Admiral was asked to reconsider his decision. A
compromise was reached when it was agreed that the main
body of the convoy would anchor off Aden whilst HMS Duke
of Edinburgh and three transports went ahead to Perim
and Sheikh Syed. The combined convoy comprised the two
large warship escorts and 37 transports, plus one ship
of the Indian Marine.
On
6 November Brigadier General Cox transferred to the
fastest of the three transports so that he could sail on
ahead of the convoy and be briefed by Major Bradshaw.
His ship anchored in Aden Outer Harbour early evening on
the 8th, when Major Bradshaw went aboard.
When the orders had been sent to the convoys they had
also been passed to the GOC in Aden. On the 4th Shaw had
made a strong recommendation to India that Cox should be
accompanied to Sheikh Syed by a selected Political
Officer (presumably this would have been Lieutenant
Colonel Jacob, Shaw’s 1st Assistant) so that the local
tribes could be reassured of British intentions. Since
no reply seems to have been sent to this request, Shaw
presumably had little option but to obey the order he
had been given, that only Major Bradshaw should be told
of what was planned. As a result no political officer
accompanied Bradshaw when he went aboard Cox’s
transport. Cox himself went aboard the Duke of Edinburgh
when she arrived at 10 the following morning, in order
to coordinate the naval plan with her captain, Captain
Blackett RN. Cox then returned to his ship to give out
his orders to his battalion commanders. HMS Duke of
Edinburgh and the three transports then sailed at 1700
hrs for Sheikh Syed. The task force anchored off Fort
Turba early hrs on the 10th, but at 0300 hrs the
decision was taken that the weather would prevent a
landing on the beaches originally selected, which were
well away from the fort. The new area was under the guns
of the fort, so at first light it was bombarded for an
hour and a half by the Duke of Edinburgh. The Turkish
guns there consisted of two 6-in Krupp and four field
guns and the Krupp guns are recorded as having returned
the fire, albeit without effect. Two hours later the two
Punjabi battalions started to land in the sheltered bay
directly under the guns of the fort. The landing was
made in the face of small-arms fire but, under covering
fire from the Duke of Edinburgh, resistance was soon
overcome and the fort and surrounding high ground
captured.
The boats used to land the assaulting infantry were
towed to the shore by three tugs, two of which had been
commandeered from the Perim Coal Company. The third had
been brought from Aden. In his initial report Cox gave
five reasons for the landing having been greatly
delayed: strong winds, leaky transport boats,
unsatisfactory tugs, shallow water and heavy shrapnel
fire. As a result only one and a half battalions were
put ashore in the first four hours; casualties were
light, four killed and 16 wounded. Altogether 3,000 men
were landed.
Demolition parties from the 1/23rd went ashore to deal
with the guns and ammunition. The two Krupp and the four
field guns were destroyed together with a large quantity
of shells and cordite and 100,000 rounds of small-arms
ammunition. The 1/23rd were re-embarked by 1500 hrs on
the 11th and sailed for Aden, taking with them Major
Bradshaw. By 1800 hrs the whole force was back aboard
the transports which then rejoined HMS Swiftsure and the
remainder of the convoy to continue to Egypt. |
